A recent Navy investigation has revealed that the tragic drownings of two Navy SEALs during a maritime intercept operation off the coast of Somalia were preventable, caused by inadequate training and unclear guidance on flotation procedures.
The report concludes that systemic issues contributed to the deaths of Chief Special Warfare Operator Christopher Chambers and Naval Special Warfare Operator 1st Class Nathan Ingram, two highly trained members of the elite SEAL Team Three.
The incident occurred during a night-time boarding operation in January 2024, as the SEALs attempted to intercept a ship suspected of transporting Iranian weapons to Yemen. Both Chambers and Ingram fell into turbulent waters while trying to board the vessel. Chambers, the platoon’s Leading Petty Officer, fell from the side of the ship, and Ingram jumped into the water to assist him.
The investigation highlights that both SEALs, weighed down by heavy gear, disappeared beneath the surface in less than a minute. Chambers was visible for only 26 seconds, while Ingram remained at the surface for 32 seconds before being lost to the sea.
The report notes that neither their physical strength nor the emergency flotation devices they were equipped with were sufficient to keep them afloat in the rough seas.
“The entire tragic event elapsed in just 47 seconds, and two Naval Special Warfare officers were lost to the sea,†the investigation stated. The report underscores that systemic failures in training, equipment, and execution all played a role in the fatal outcome.
The mission in question was part of a larger naval effort to intercept arms shipments to Yemen. SEAL Team Three had deployed aboard the USS Lewis B. Puller in December 2023, with maritime intercepts being their primary objective. In the weeks leading up to the tragedy, the team had successfully conducted two daylight boardings of similar vessels known as dhows, under varying sea conditions.
On January 12, 2024, the Navy began tracking a slow-moving dhow believed to be carrying Iranian arms. SEAL Team Three planned an intercept for January 13 but moved the operation up by a day due to weather conditions. However, at least one crew member expressed concerns that the mission was being rushed. Despite the reservations, the team pressed forward with the intercept.
The investigation found that the SEALs entered rough waters with wave heights between six and seven feet, near the Navy’s upper limit for such nighttime operations. Difficult conditions required multiple approaches before the SEALs could board the dhow, with six successfully doing so on the first two attempts. However, during the third approach, as the ship rolled heavily in the turbulent sea, Chambers fell overboard. Ingram, seeing his fellow operator in distress, immediately jumped in after him. Tragically, neither man resurfaced.
Search and rescue efforts were launched immediately and continued for 10 days, covering a vast area of 48,600 square miles, but the bodies of Chambers and Ingram were never recovered. The investigation notes that, in accordance with Navy policy, no further recovery attempts were made, as the sea is considered a “fit and final resting place” for service members lost in maritime operations.
One of the key findings of the investigation was that neither SEAL was adequately trained in the use of the Tactical Flotation Support System (TFSS), an emergency flotation device designed to prevent such incidents. It remains unclear whether either Chambers or Ingram attempted to activate their flotation systems during the crisis.
The report also pointed to confusion regarding the Navy’s buoyancy requirements for boarding operations. While the Naval Special Warfare Force Readiness Manual emphasizes the need for positive buoyancy—the ability to stay afloat—there is no clear guidance on how to achieve it during missions. The investigation found that SEAL Team Three conducted buoyancy tests before deployment in San Diego waters but failed to perform similar tests after they embarked on the mission aboard the Lewis B. Puller.
Conflicting instructions about the type of buoyancy required—whether positive or neutral—added to the confusion. With no standardized guidelines, individual SEALs were left to determine how to configure their flotation gear, a dangerous ambiguity that proved fatal.
“This incident, marked by systemic issues, was preventable,†wrote General Michael “Erik†Kurilla, the commander of U.S. Central Command, in his review of the investigation. In recognition of their service, both Chambers and Ingram were posthumously promoted.
The Navy’s investigation has resulted in a series of recommendations aimed at addressing the failures that led to the deaths of the two SEALs. Among the recommendations are the formalization of buoyancy requirements for all maritime operations, enhanced training on emergency flotation devices, and a thorough review of lifesaving equipment on Navy boarding vessels.
Additionally, the report calls for the evaluation of a fail-safe flotation device that could automatically activate in emergencies, offering additional protection to SEALs and other boarding teams operating in dangerous conditions.
