Somali Federal Government Moves Forward with “Plan B” After Failed Talks with Jubaland

The Federal Government of Somalia has reportedly activated its long-prepared contingency strategy — dubbed “Plan B” — following the collapse of reconciliation talks between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Jubaland leader Ahmed Mohamed Islam, widely known as Ahmed Madobe.

The key players in this unfolding political standoff are President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre, and Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe. Kenya also features as a diplomatic mediator, having facilitated recent but unsuccessful talks in Kismayo, Jubaland’s administrative capital.

According to reliable sources within Villa Somalia, a series of back-to-back meetings held between Monday afternoon and late evening resulted in a crucial government decision: to proceed with the formation of a new Jubaland administration headquartered in Garbahaarey, the capital of Gedo region.

President Hassan Sheikh reportedly told senior government officials and members of parliament that the stalemate in Kismayo had reached a breaking point, declaring that “the matter of Jubaland is now officially in the hands of the government.” The President emphasized that while he serves as the nation’s figurehead, the operational lead has been handed over to Prime Minister Hamza Barre to implement the new plan.

The meetings that sealed this decision took place in Mogadishu over the past 48 hours, following weeks of fruitless negotiations in Kismayo. Sources close to the Prime Minister’s office confirm that Monday night, Hamza Barre convened a second high-level meeting with Jubaland political figures and clan elders to discuss the technical framework for establishing a provisional regional government in Garbahaarey.

The collapse of the Kismayo talks stemmed from two irreconcilable positions:

• President Hassan Sheikh demanded that Ahmed Madobe step down, arguing that his re-election violated the federal constitution.
• Ahmed Madobe, however, insisted that his election must first be recognized before any discussions on political reform could proceed.

These hardline stances left the Kenyan mediators — who had invested significant diplomatic effort — with no option but to withdraw from Kismayo and return to Nairobi, marking a clear diplomatic failure.

Under the new plan, the Federal Government aims to create a legally recognized Jubaland authority centered in Garbahaarey, effectively bypassing the current Kismayo-based administration.

Insiders indicate that the Prime Minister’s Office has begun consultations on the composition and leadership of the new interim administration, which will likely include clan representatives from the Gedo region and government-aligned figures.

The move is strategically reinforced by the fact that federal forces have already secured several key districts in Gedo, and the government enjoys strong support from the Marehan clan, the dominant community in the region — a dynamic that could ease the rollout of this new structure.

Tensions between Mogadishu and Kismayo are not new. The Federal Government and Jubaland administration have been locked in a decade-long power struggle over legitimacy, control of resources, and representation in national institutions.

President Hassan Sheikh’s first administration (2012–2017) also faced similar disputes with Ahmed Madobe, which were only temporarily subdued during President Farmaajo’s tenure.

The latest breakdown reflects a renewed centralization drive by Villa Somalia, as the current government seeks to bring federal member states under tighter constitutional compliance and end what it views as “rogue administrations.”

With the Kismayo negotiations dead and Plan B in motion, Somalia is entering another phase of political turbulence.

Analysts warn that establishing a parallel Jubaland administration could heighten tensions and potentially deepen the federal fragmentation the government claims to be fixing.

Nonetheless, President Hassan Sheikh’s government appears determined to assert federal authority, signaling that Mogadishu will no longer tolerate regional governments operating outside the constitutional framework.

If executed, “Jubaland 2.0” based in Garbahaarey could redefine the balance of power in southern Somalia — for better or worse.