Abu Dhabi, UAE – What began as a notorious private military company accused of war crimes in Iraq has, under Emirati patronage, expanded into a sprawling global network of mercenaries shaping conflicts from the Horn of Africa to the Middle East.
After the 2007 Nisour Square massacre in Baghdad, Blackwater rebranded several times — Xe Services, then Academi — but its essence remained intact: a for-profit machine of outsourced warfare. Fleeing US legal scrutiny, its founder, Erik Prince, found both refuge and a wealthy backer in Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed.
From the sands of Somalia to the ruins of Gaza, this partnership has built a mercenary infrastructure that analysts say blurs the line between national defence, private enterprise, and covert statecraft.
Abu Dhabi’s Mercenary Blueprint
By 2011, Prince had quietly assembled a private army in the Emirates. Hundreds of Latin American fighters — many from Colombia, Panama, and Chile — were smuggled into Abu Dhabi under the guise of construction workers. Trained in Zayed Military City, their mission was to guard the monarchy, suppress dissent, and extend Emirati influence abroad.
The Washington Post later revealed that by 2022, Gulf states had hired over 500 retired US military personnel, with contracts reaching $300,000 annually. For critics, this confirmed that Abu Dhabi had become the world’s most active financier of mercenary warfare.
Somalia: A Recruitment Hub
Somalia quickly became central to this shadow empire. In 2011, Prince oversaw a UAE-funded, US-backed programme to train 2,000 Somali fighters under the pretext of combating piracy. While hijackings had gripped the Horn of Africa’s shipping lanes, the initiative also secured Abu Dhabi a direct foothold in Somalia’s security apparatus.
Soon, Somalia’s territory was being used as a logistics and transit corridor for fighters destined for Yemen, Libya, and Sudan. Somali recruits themselves were later deployed alongside Sudanese, Ugandan, and Latin American mercenaries in Yemen’s war — particularly in brutal battles along the Saudi-Yemeni border.
Meanwhile, UAE-linked firms such as Lancaster 6 and Opus Capital expanded operations across East Africa, helping Abu Dhabi consolidate control over key Red Sea ports, from Eritrea to Somaliland. This gave the Emirates not only military depth but also economic leverage over regional trade routes.
Sudan’s War and Somali Entanglement
When Sudan’s conflict reignited in 2023, evidence mounted that Somali soil had again become a staging ground. Colombian outlets reported that mercenaries were flown through Somalia and Chad en route to Darfur, where they fought alongside Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) — a militia accused of mass atrocities.
These fighters were promised salaries of up to $3,000 a month and bonuses of $10,000, with access to drones and heavy weapons. The UN Security Council later confirmed that UAE-linked networks were embedded in RSF supply chains, with injured mercenaries evacuated to Emirati hospitals.
In August 2025, the crash of a UAE military aircraft in Darfur exposed the extent of this involvement: 40 Colombian fighters were killed. The revelation sparked condemnation from Colombian President Gustavo Petro, who denounced what he called “merchants of death.”
Gaza and Beyond
Abu Dhabi’s outsourcing model has extended far beyond Africa. Reports in 2024 indicated that Emirati-financed mercenaries were deployed to support Israel’s military operations in Gaza and Lebanon. Witnesses described tanks carrying both Israeli and Emirati flags, while detainees reported interrogations by soldiers speaking Arabic in a distinct Emirati dialect.
Diplomats suggested these efforts formed part of “day after” planning for a depopulated Gaza. Images of UAE-plated vehicles in Rafah only deepened suspicions that Emirati-backed militias were operating on Israel’s behalf.
The Globalisation of Outsourced Warfare
Prince has since launched Vectus Global, which has already won contracts in Haiti, employing the same model tested in Somalia: foreign fighters, private air support, and drones enforcing order where state security has collapsed.
What began as palace protection in Abu Dhabi has metastasised into a transnational business model. Somalia — as both a recruitment base and a transit hub — remains a vital link in this chain. For Mogadishu, the consequences are stark: weakened sovereignty, exploitation of its citizens, and entanglement in proxy wars financed by Gulf monarchies.
Analysts warn that the UAE’s reliance on hired guns erodes accountability in global conflict. While Abu Dhabi portrays its actions as stabilising, critics say it has instead normalised a system of shadow warfare — one in which fragile states like Somalia are turned into nodes in a sprawling network of privatised violence.
